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MEANFIELD GAMES AND MODEL PREDICTIVE CONTROL
PIERRE DEGOND, MICHAEL HERTY, AND JIAN-GUO LIU
Abstract. Mean-Field Games are games with a continuum of players that incorporate
the time-dimension through a control-theoretic approach. Recently, simpler approaches
relying on the Best Reply Strategy have been proposed. They assume that the agents
navigate their strategies towards their goal by taking the direction of steepest descent
of their cost function (i.e. the opposite of the utility function). In this paper, we
explore the link between Mean-Field Games and the Best Reply Strategy approach.
This is done by introducing a Model Predictive Control framework, which consists of
setting the Mean-Field Game over a short time interval which recedes as time moves
on. We show that the Model Predictive Control offers a compromise between a possibly
unrealistic Mean-Field Game approach and the sub-optimal Best Reply Strategy.
AMS subject classifications: 90B30, 35L65
Keywords: mean–field games, multi–agent systems
1. Introduction
According to the definition of the Handbook [21], systemic risk is the risk of a disrup-
tion of the proper functioning of the market which results in the reduction of the growth
of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In economics, a system such as a market
can be described by a game, i.e. a set of agents endowed with strategies (and possibly
other attributes) that they may play upon to maximize their utility function. In a game,
the utility function depends on the other agents’ strategies. The proper functioning of a
market is associated to a Nash equilibrium of this game, i.e. a set of strategies such that
no agent can improve on his utility function by changing his own strategy, given that
the other agents’ strategies are fixed. At the market scale, the number and diversity of
agents is huge and it is more effective to use games with a continuum of players. Games
with a continuum of players have been widely explored [4, 27, 31, 32].
To study systemic risk and its induced catastrophic changes in the economy, it is of
primary importance to incorporate the time-dimension into the description of the system.
A possible framework to achieve this is by means of a control-theoretic approach, where
the optimal goal is not a simple Nash equilibrium, but a whole set of optimal trajectories
of the agents in the strategy space. Such an approach has been formalized in the seminal
work of [26] and popularized under the name of ’Mean-Field Game (MFG)’. It has given
rise to an abundant literature, among which (to cite only a few) [8, 7, 6, 24, 12]. The
MFG approach offers a promising route to investigate systemic risk. For instance, in
the recent work [13], the MFG framework has been proposed to model systemic risk
associated with inter-bank borrowing and lending strategies.
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However, the fact that the agents are able to optimize their trajectory over a large time
horizon in the spirit of physical particles subjected to the least action principle can be
seen as a bit unrealistic. A related but different approach has been proposed in [19] and
builds on earlier work on pedestrian dynamics [16]. It consists in assuming that agents
perform the so-called ’Best-Reply Strategy’ (BRS): they determine a local (in time)
direction of steepest descent (of the cost function, i.e. minus the utility function) and
evolve their strategy variable in this direction. This approach has been applied to models
describing the evolution of the wealth distribution among interacting economies, in the
case of conservative [17] and nonconservative economies [18]. However, the link between
MFG and BRS was still to be elaborated. This is the object of the present paper. We
show that the BRS can be obtained as a MFG over a short interval of time which recedes
as times evolves. This type of control is known as Model Predictive Control (MPC) or
as Receding Horizon Control. The fact that the agents may be able to optimize the
trajectories in the strategy space over a small but finite interval of time is certainly a
reasonable assumption and this MPC strategy could be viewed as an improvement over
the BRS and some kind of compromise between the BRS and a fully optimal but fairly
unrealistic MFG strategy. We believe that MPC can lead to a promising route to model
systemic risk. In this paper though, we propose a general framework to connect BRS
to MFG through MPC and defer its application to specific models of systemic risk to
future work.
Recently, many contributions on meanfield games and control mechanisms for particle
systems have been made. For more details on meanfield games we refer to [8, 7, 6,
24, 12, 26]. Among the many possible meanfield games to consider we are interested
in differential (Nash) games of possibly infinitely many particles (also called players).
Most of the literature in this respect treats theoretical and numerical approaches for
solving the Hamilton–Jacobi Bellmann (HJB) equation for the value function of the
underlying game, see e.g. [12] for an overview. Solving the HJB equation allows to
determine the optimal control for the particle game. However, the associated HJB
equation posses several theoretical and numerical difficulties among which the need to
solve it backwards in time is the most severe one, at least from a numerical perspective.
Therefore, recently model predictive control (MPC) concepts on the level particles or of
the associated kinetic equation have been proposed [16, 15, 20, 11, 1, 18, 17, 11]. While
MPC has been well established in the case of finite–dimensional problems [23, 33, 28], and
also in engineering literature under the term receding horizon control, contributions to
systems of infinitely many interacting particles and/or game theoretic questions related
to infinitely many particles are rather recent. It has been shown that MPC concepts
applied to problems of infinitely many interacting particles have the advantage to allow
for efficient computation [1, 17]. However, by construction MPC only leads to suboptimal
solutions, see for example [25] for a comparison in the case of simple opinion formation
model. Also, the existing approaches mostly for alignment models do not necessarily
treat game theoretic concepts but focus on for example sparse global controls [15, 20, 11],
time–scale separation and local mean–field controls [18] called best–reply strategy, or
MPC on very short time–scales [1] called instantaneous control. Typically the MPC
strategy is obtained solving an auxiliary problem (implicit or explicit) and the resulting
expression for the control is substituted back into the original dynamics leading to a
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possibly modified and new dynamics. Then, a meanfield description is derived using
Boltzmann or a macroscopic approximation. This requires the action of the control to
be local in time and independent of future states of the system contrary to solutions of
the HJB equation. Usually in MPC approaches independent optimal control problems
are solved where particles do not anticipate the optimal control choices other particles
contrary to meanfield games [26].
In this paper we contribute to the recent discussion by formal computations leading
to a link between meanfield games and MPC concepts proposed on the level of particle
games and associated kinetic equations. The relationship we plan to establish is high-
lighted in Figure 1.1. More precisely, we want to show that the MPC concept of the
best–reply strategy [17] may be at least formally be derived from a meanfield games
context.
Figure 1.1. Relation between MPC concepts and meanfield games.
The starting point are finite–dimensional differential games with N play-
ers in the top left part (Section 2). The connection for N → ∞ of this
games has been investigated for example in [26, 12] and leads to the HJB
for meanfield games in the bottom left part of the figure (Section 3).
If applying MPC concepts to the differential game as for example the
best-reply strategy we obtain a controlled dynamics for N particles in
the top right part [17] (Section 2.1). The meanfield limit for N → ∞
leads to a kinetic equation in the bottom right part (Section 2.2). Those
results are summarized in Lemma 2.1. This paper also investigates the
link between the meanfield game and the kinetic equation indicated by a
question mark. The result is summarized in Proposition 3.1.
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2. Setting of the problem
We consider N particles labeled by i = 1, . . . , N where each particle has a state xi ∈ R.
We denote by X = (xi)
N
i=1 the state of all particles and by X−i = (xj)
N
j=1,j 6=i the states
of all particles except i. Further, we assume that each particle’s dynamics is governed
by a smooth function fi : RN → R depending on the state X and we assume that
each particle may control its dynamics by a control ui. The dynamics for the particles
i = 1, . . . , N is then given by
(2.1)
d
dt
xi(t) = fi(X(t)) + ui(t), i = 1, . . . , N,
and initial conditions
(2.2) xi(0) = x¯i.
We will drop the time–dependence of the variables whenever the intention is clear. Ex-
amples of models of the type (2.1) are alignment models in socio–ecological context,
microscopic traffic flow models, production and many more, see e.g. the recent survey
[29, 30, 34]. In recent contributions to control theory for equation (2.1) the case of a
single control variable ui ≡ u for all i has been considered [1, 2, 11]. Here, we allow each
particle to chose its own control strategy ui. We suppose a control horizon of T > 0 be
given. As in [12] we suppose that particle i minimizes its own objective functional and
determines therefore the optimal u∗i by
(2.3) u∗i (·) = argmin ui:[0,T ]→R
∫ T
0
(
αi(s)
2
u2i (s) + hi(X(s))
)
ds, i = 1, . . . , N.
Herein, X(s) is the solution to (2.1) and equation (2.2). The optimal control and the
corresponding optimal trajectory will from now on be denoted with superscript ∗. The
minimization is performed on all sufficiently smooth functions ui : [0, T ] → R. There
is no restriction on the control ui similar to [26]. The objective hi : RN → R related
to particle i is also supposed to be sufficiently smooth. The weights of the control
αi(t) > 0,∀i, t ≥ 0 and under additional conditions convexity of each optimization
problem (2.3) is guaranteed. As seen in Section 3 a challenge in solving the problem
(2.3) relies on the fact that the associated HJB has to be solved backwards in time.
Contrary to [1, 11] problem (2.3) are in fact N optimization problems that need to be
solved simultaneously due to the dependence of X on U = (ui)
N
i=1 through equation
(2.1). This implies that each particle i anticipates the optimal strategy of all other
particles U∗−i when determining its optimal control u
∗
i . Obviously, the problem (2.3)
simplifies when each particle i anticipates an a priori fixed strategy of all other particles
U−i. Then, the problem (2.3) decouples (in i) and the optimal strategy ui is determined
independent of the optimal strategies U∗−i. It has been argued that this is the case for
reaction in pedestrian motions [18]. In fact, therein the following best–reply strategy
has been proposed as a substitute for problem (2.1)
(2.4) ui(t) = −∂xihi(X(t)), t ∈ [0, T ].
As in the meanfield theory presented in [26, 12] we need to impose assumptions (A) on
fi(X) and hi(X) before passing to the limit N →∞. The assumption (B) will be used
in Section 3.
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(A) For all i = 1, . . . , N and any permutation σi : {1, . . . , N}\{i} → {1, . . . , N}\{i}
we have
fi(X) = f(xi, X−i) and f(xi, X−i) = f(xi, Xσi)
for a smooth function f : R×RN−1 → R and where Xσi = (xσi(j))Nj=1,j 6=i. Further
we assume that for each i the function hi(X) enjoys the same properties as stated
for fi(X).
(B) We assume that αi(t) = α(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ] and all i = 1, . . . , N.
Under additional growth conditions sequences of symmetric functions in many variables
have a limit in the space of functions defined on probability measures, see e.g. [12,
Theorem 2.1], [8, Theorem 4.1]. The corresponding result is recalled as Theorem A.1 in
the appendix for convenience.
To exemplify computations later on we will use a basic wealth model [9, 14, 19, 18]
where
(2.5) fi(X) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
P (xi, xj)(xj − xi)
for some bounded, non–negative and smooth function P (x, x˜). Clearly, f fulfills (A). As
objective function we use a measure depending only on aggregated quantities as in [17].
An example fulfilling (A) is
(2.6) hi(X) =
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
φ(xi, xj)
for some smooth function φ : R× R→ R.
Finally, we introduce some additional notation. We denote by P(R) the space of Borel
probability measures over R. The empirical discrete probability measure mN ∈ P(R)
concentrated at a positions X ∈ RN is denoted by
mNX =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ(x− xi).
We also use this notation if X is time dependent, i.e., X = X(t), leading to the family
of probability measures mNX = m
N
X(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ(x−xi(t)). If the intention is clear we do
not explicitly denote the dependence on x of the measure mNX (and on time t if X = X(t)
is time-dependent).
Based on the assumption (A) we will frequently use Theorem [12, Theorem 2.1]. This
theorem is repeated for convenience in the appendix as Theorem A.1: let g : RN → R
such that g is symmetric g(X) = g(Xσ) where Xσ = (xσ(i))
N
i=1 and any permutation
σ : {1, . . . , N} → {1, . . . , N}. We may extend g to a function gN : P(R) → R such
that gN (mNX) = g(X). Under assumptions given in Theorem A.1 the family (g
N )∞N=1 is
equicontinuous and there exists a limit g : P(R) → R such that up to a subsequence
lim
N→∞
supX |g(X) − g(mNX)| = 0. The result can be extended to a family of functions
f fulfilling assumption (A), see [8, Theorem 4.1]. We obtain an equicontinuous family
(fN )∞N=1 with f
N : R × P(R) → R such that fN (ξ,mN−1X−i ) = f(ξ,X−i) with limit
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f : R × P(R) → R and such that for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and a compact set Q ⊂ RN−1
we have for any fixed R > 0
(2.7) lim
N→∞
sup
|ξ|<R,X−i⊂Q
|f(ξ,X−i)− f(ξ,mNX)| = 0.
In equation (2.7) we have the empirical measure on N points in the argument of f even
so fN is defined on the empirical measure mN−1X−i , i.e., we have
lim
N→∞
sup
|ξ|<R,X−i⊂Q
|fN (ξ,mN−1X−i )− f(ξ,mNX)| = 0.
This is true since in the definition of fN the contribution of the empirical measure is 1N
for each point xi. More details are given in [8] and [12, Section 7]. Since in the following
it is often of importance to highlight the dependence on the empirical measure mNX we
introduce the following notation: we write
f(ξ,X−i) = fN (ξ,mN−1X−i ) ∼ f(ξ,mNX),
whenever equation (2.7) holds true.
2.1. From differential games to controlled particle dynamics. The best–reply
strategy (2.4) is obtained also from a MPC approach [28] applied to equations (2.1)
and (2.3). In order to derive the best–reply strategy we consider the following problem:
suppose we are given the state X(t) of the system (2.1) at time t > 0. Then, we consider
a control horizon of the MPC of ∆t > 0 and supposedly small. We assume that the
applied control ui(s) on (t, t + ∆t) is constant. For particle i we denote the unknown
constant by u˜i. Instead of solving the problem (2.3) now on the full time interval (t, T )
we consider the objective function only on the receding time horizon (t, t+∆t). Further,
we discretize the dynamics (2.1) on (t, t + ∆t) using an explicit Euler discretization
for the initial value X¯ = Xi(t). We discretize the objective function by a Riemann
sum. A naive discretization leads to a penalization of the control of the type αi(t+∆t)2 u˜
2.
Since the explicit Euler discretization in equation (2.8) is only accurate up to order
O((∆t)2) we additionally require to have u˜i = O(1) to obtain a meaningful control in
the discretization (2.8) and also in the limit for ∆t→ 0. Therefore, in the MPC problem
we need to scale the penalization of the control accordingly by ∆t. This leads to a MPC
problem associated with equation (2.3) and given by
xi(t+ ∆t) = x¯i + ∆t
(
fi(X¯) + u˜i
)
, i = 1, . . . , N,(2.8)
u˜i = argmin u˜∈R∆t
(
hi (X(t+ ∆t)) + ∆t
αi(t+ ∆t)
2
u˜2
)
, i = 1, . . . , N.(2.9)
Solving the minimization problem (2.9) leads to
αi(t+ ∆t) u˜i = −∂xihi(X¯), i = 1, . . . , N.
Now, we obtain a u˜i of order O(1) by Taylor expansion of αi at time t. Within the MPC
approach the control for the time interval (t, t+∆t) is therefore given by equation (2.10).
(2.10) u˜i = − 1
αi(t)
∂xihi(X¯), i = 1, . . . , N.
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Usually, the dynamics (2.8) is then computed with the computed control up to t + ∆t.
Then, the process is repeated using the new state X(t + ∆t). Substituting (2.10) into
(2.8) and letting ∆t→ 0 we obtain
(2.11)
d
dt
xi(t) = fi(X(t))− 1
αi(t)
∂xihi(X(t)), i = 1, . . . , N, t ∈ [0, T ].
This dynamics coincide with the dynamics generated by the best–reply strategy (2.4)
provided that αi(t) ≡ 1. Therefore, on a particle level the controlled dynamics (2.11) of
the best–reply strategy [17] is equivalent to a MPC formulation of the problem (2.3).
For the toy example we obtain
(2.12)
d
dt
xi =
1
N
N∑
j=1
P (xi, xj)(xj − xi)− 1
(N − 1)αi(t)
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
∂xiφ(xi, xj).
2.2. From controlled particle dynamics (2.11) to kinetic equation. The consid-
erations herein have essentially been studied for the best–reply strategy in the series of
papers [19, 17, 18] and it is only repeated for convenience. The starting point is the con-
trolled dynamics given by equation (2.11) which slightly extends the best–reply strategy.
In order to pass to the meanfield limit we assume that (A) and (B) holds true. Then
the particles are governed by
(2.13)
d
dt
xi(t) = f(xi(t), X−i(t))− 1
α(t)
∂xih(xi(t), X−i(t)), i = 1, . . . , N.
Associated with the trajectories X = X(t) the discrete probability measure mNX is
given by mNX =
1
N
N∑
j=1
δ(x − xi(t)). Using the weak formulation for a test function ψ :
R→ R we compute the dynamics of mNX over time as
d
dt
∫
ψ(x)mNXdx =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫
ψ′(x)
(
f(x,X−i)− 1
α
∂xh(x,X−i)
)
δ(x− xi(t))dx
Using [12, Theorem 2.1] and denoting by mN−1X−j (t) =
1
N−1
∑
k=1,k 6=j
δ(x−xk(t)) a family
of empirical measures on R we obtain from the previous equation
d
dt
∫
ψ(x)mNXdx =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫
ψ′(x)
(
fN (x,mN−1X−i )−
1
α
∂xh
N (x,mN−1X−i )
)
δ(x− xi(t))dx
for some function fN , hN : R × P(R) → R. Assume f and h fulfill the assertions of
[8, Theorem 4.1]. Then, we obtain in the sense of equation (2.7) that for any i and N
sufficiently large f(x,mNX) ∼ fN (x,mN−1X−i ) and h(x,mNX) ∼ hN (x,X−i) and therefore in
the sense of equation (2.7)
d
dt
∫
ψ(x)mNXdx =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫
ψ′(x)
(
f(x,mNX)−
1
α
∂xh(x,m
N
X)
)
δ(x− xi(t))dx =∫
ψ′(x)mNX
(
f(x,mNX)−
1
α
∂xh(x,m
N
X)
)
dx
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This is the weak form of the kinetic equation for a probability measure m = m(t, x)
(2.14) ∂tm+ ∂x
(
m
(
f(x,m)− 1
α
∂xh(x,m)
))
= 0
For the toy example the corresponding function fN is given by
fN (x,mNX−i) =
N − 1
N
(∫
P (x, y)(y − x)mNX−i(t, y)dy
)
and f(x,mNX) =
∫
P (x, y)(y − x)mNX(t, y)dy. Therefore, we obtain
∂tm(t, x) + ∂x
(∫ (
P (x, y)(y − x)− 1
α
∂xφ(x, y)
)
m(t, x)m(t, y)dy
)
= 0.
We summarize the previous findings in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Consider a fixed time horizon T > 0 and consider N particles governed by
the dynamics (2.1) and initial conditions (2.2). Assume (A) and (B) hold true. Assume
each particle i = 1, . . . , N , chooses its control ui at time t ∈ [0, T ] by
(2.15) ui(t) = − 1
αi(t)
∂xihi(X(t)).
Assume that mN
X¯
→ m ∈ P(R) for N → ∞. Then, the meanfield limit of the particle
dynamics (2.1) and (2.15) is given by
(2.16) ∂tm+ ∂x
(
m
(
f(x,m)− 1
α
∂xh(x,m)
))
= 0
for initial data m(t = 0, x) = m.
Finally, we summarize the MPC approach. Consider a time interval ∆t > 0, an
equidistant discretization t` = (` − 1)∆t, ` = 1, . . . , NT such that NT∆t = T and a
first–order numerical discretization of N particle dynamics (2.1) given by
(2.17) x`,i = x`−1,i + ∆t (fi(X(t`)) + u˜`,i) , ` = 1, . . . , NT and x0,i = x¯i.
for xi(t`) = x`,i and i = 1, . . . , N. Let in equation (2.17) be the control ui(t) =
NT∑`
=1
χ[(`−1)∆t,`∆t)(t)u˜`,i is piecewise constant. The constants u˜`,i obtained as discretization
in time of equation (2.15) are given by
(2.18) u˜`,i = − 1
αi(t`)
∂xihi(X(t`)), ` = 1, . . . , NT .
Then, each u˜`,i coincides up toO(∆t) with optimal control on the time interval [(`− 1)∆t, `∆t)
of the minimization problems (2.19). For each ` = 1, . . . , NT and each fixed value X(t`−1)
we have up O(∆t)
(2.19) u˜`,i = argminu∈R
(
hi(X(t`)) + ∆t
αi(t`)
2
u2
)
, i = 1, . . . , N,
where X(t`) is given by equation (2.17).
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3. Results related to meanfield games
In this paragraph we consider the limit of the problem (2.3) for a large number of
particles. This has been investigated for example in [26] and derivations (in a slightly dif-
ferent setting) have been detailed in [12, Section 7]. In order to show the links presented
in Figure 1.1 we repeat the formal computations in [12].
A notion of solution to the competing N optimization problem (2.3) is the concept of
Nash equilibrium. If it exists it may be computed for the differential games using the
HJB equation. We briefly present computations leading to the HJB equation. Then, we
discuss the large particle limit of the HJB equation and derive the best–reply strategy.
3.1. Derivation of the finite–dimensional HJB equation. The HJB equation de-
scribes the evolution of a value function Vi = Vi(t, Y ) of the particle i. The value function
is defined as the future costs for a particle trajectory governed by equation (2.1) and
starting at time t ∈ (0, T ), position Y and control ui : (t, T )→ R, i = 1, . . . , N,
(3.20) Vi(t, Y ) =
∫ T
t
(
αi(s)
2
u2i (s) + hi(X(s))
)
ds,
where X(s) = (xi(s))
N
i=1 is the solution to equation (2.1) with control U and initial
condition
(3.21) X(t) = Y.
Among all possible controls ui we denote by u
∗
i the optimal control that minimizes
Vi(t, Y ). We investigate the relation of the value function of particle i to the optimal
control u∗i . To this end assume that the coupled problem (2.3) has a unique solution
denoted by U∗ = (u∗i )
N
i=1. Each u
∗
i : [t, T ]→ R for each i = 1, . . . , N , is hence a solution
to
u∗i = argmin ui(·):[t,T ]→R{Vi(t, Y ) : X solves (3.28)}, i = 1, . . . , N.
The corresponding particle trajectories are denoted by X∗ = (x∗i )
N
i=1 and are obtained
through (2.1) for an initial condition X∗(0) = X¯.
Since X∗(·) depends on U∗, minimizing the value function (3.20) leads to the com-
putation of formal derivatives of Vi with respect to ui. The optimal control u
∗
i is then
found as formal point (in function space) where the derivative of Vi with respect to ui
vanishes. We have as Gateaux derivative of Vi in an arbitrary direction v : [0, T ]→ R
d
dui
Vi(t, Y )[v] =
∫ T
t
(
αi(s)u
∗
i (s) +
N∑
k=1
∂xkhi(X
∗(s))∂ui (x
∗
k(s))
)
v(s)ds = 0(3.22)
The derivative is not easily computed due to the unknown derivative of each state x∗k
with respect to the acting control u∗i . However, choosing a set of suitable co-states
φ`j : [0, T ]→ R for ` = 1, . . . , N and j = 1, . . . , N, we may simplify the previous equation
(3.22): we test equation (2.1) by functions φ`j : [0, T ] → R for `, j = 1, . . . , N such that
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φ`j(T ) = 0 and integrate on (t, T ) with 0 ≤ t < T and initial data at X∗(t) = Y to obtain
N∑
j=1
{∫ T
t
− d
ds
(φ`j(s))x
∗
j (s)− φ`j(s)
(
fj(X
∗(s)) + u∗j (s)
)
ds− φ`j(t)yj
}
= 0, ` = 1, . . . , N.
(3.23)
The derivative with respect to ui in an arbitrary direction v is then∫ T
t

N∑
j=1
(
− d
ds
(φ`j(s))∂ui
(
x∗j (s)
)− φ`j(s)
(
N∑
k=1
∂xk (fj(X
∗(s))) ∂ui(x
∗
k(s))
))
− φ`i(s)

×v(s)ds = 0.(3.24)
The previous equation can be equivalently rewritten as
N∑
k=1
− d
ds
φ`k(s)−
N∑
j=1
φ`j(s)∂xkfj(X
∗(s))
 ∂ui(x∗k(s))v(s)ds = ∫ T
t
φ`i(s)v(s)ds.(3.25)
Let φij for i, j = 1, . . . , N fulfill the coupled linear system of adjoint equations (or co-state
equations), solved backwards in time,
− d
dt
φij(t)−
N∑
k=1
φik(t)∂xj (fk(X
∗(t)) = ∂xjhi(X
∗(t)), φij(T ) = 0.(3.26)
Then, formally for every s ∈ (t, T ) we have
N∑
j=1
∂xjhi(X
∗(s))∂ui(xj(s)) =
N∑
k=1
− d
dt
φik(s)∂ui(x
∗
k(s))−
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
φij(s)∂xk(fj(X
∗(s))∂ui(x
∗
k(s)).
Since for all v we have
N∑
j=1
∫ T
t
∂xjhi(X
∗(s))∂ui
(
x∗j (s)
)
v(s)ds =
∫ T
t
φii(s)v(s)ds
it follows that
N∑
j=1
∂xjhi(X
∗(s))∂ui
(
x∗j (s)
)
= φii(s)
for s ∈ (t, T ). At optimality the necessary condition is
d
dui
Vi(t, Y )[v] = 0
for all v which implies that thanks to equation (3.22) we obtain for a.e. s ∈ (t, T )
(αi(s)u
∗
i (s)) +
N∑
j=1
∂xjhi(X
∗(s))∂ui
(
x∗j (s)
)
= 0.
This leads to the following equation a.e. in s ∈ (t, T )
αi(s)u
∗
i (s) + φ
i
i(s) = 0.(3.27)
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Equations
(3.28)
d
ds
x∗j (s) = fj(X
∗(s)) + u∗j (s), X
∗(t) = Y.
and (3.26) for j = 1, . . . , N and equation (3.27) comprise the optimality conditions for
the minimization of the value function Vi(t, Y ) given by equation (3.20). Due to equation
(3.28) this system is a coupled system of ordinary differential and algebraic equations
in the unknowns S := (x∗j , u∗j , (φij)Ni=1)Nj=1. Solving for all those unknowns yields in
particular the optimal control u∗i for the value function Vi(t, Y ) for all i = 1, . . . , N. The
adjoint equation (3.26) is posed backwards in time such that the system is two–point
boundary value problem and due to the strong coupling of x∗j and φ
i
j it is not easy to solve.
The derived system is a version of Pontryagins maximum principle (PMP) for sufficient
regular and unique controls. We refer to [22, 33, 10] for more details. From now on we
assume that equation (3.27) where φij solves equation (3.26) is necessary and sufficient for
optimality of u∗i for minimizing the value function Vi(t, Y ). The corresponding optimal
trajectory and co-state is denoted by S introduced above. We formally derive the HJB
based on the previous equations of PMP and refer to [22, Chapter 8] for a careful
theoretical discussion.
Consider the function Vi(t, Y ) evaluated along the optimal trajectory S, i.e., let Vi(t) =
Vi(t,X
∗(t)). Then, by definition of Vi and S we have
−αi(t)
2
(u∗i )
2(t)− hi(X∗(t)) = d
dt
Vi(t)
= ∂tVi(t,X
∗(t)) +
N∑
k=1
∂xkVi(t,X
∗(t)) (fk(X∗(t)) + u∗k(t)) .
Using the necessary condition (3.27) we obtain
− 1
2αi(t)
(φii)
2(t)− hi(X∗(t))(3.29)
= ∂tVi(t,X
∗(t)) +
N∑
k=1
∂xkVi(t,X
∗(t))
(
fk(X
∗(t))− 1
αk(t)
φkk(t)
)
.
The trajectory of X∗(s) depends on the initial condition Y = (yi)Ni=1. Computing the
variation of Vi(t, Y ) with respect to yo for o ∈ {1, . . . , N} and evaluating at S yields
(since u∗i does not dependent on Y ):
∂yoVi(t, Y ) =
∫ T
t
(
N∑
k=1
∂xkhi(X
∗(s))∂yo(x
∗
k(s))
)
ds.
From the weak form of the state equation (3.23) we obtain after differentiation with
respect to the initial condition yo for ` = 1, . . . , N
N∑
j=1
∫ T
t
(
− d
ds
φ`j(s)∂yo(x
∗
j (s))− φ`j(s)
N∑
k=1
(∂xkfj)(X
∗(s))∂yo(x
∗
k(s))
)
ds = φ`o(t).
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Similarly to the computations before we use the equation for φij given by equation (3.26)
to express
∂yoVi(t, Y ) =
∫ T
t
(
N∑
k=1
(∂xkhi)(X
∗(s))∂yo(x
∗
k(s))
)
ds =
∫ T
t
 N∑
k=1
− d
ds
φik(s)−
N∑
j=1
φij(s)(∂xkfj)(X
∗(s))
 ∂yo(x∗k(s))
 ds = φio(t).
Therefore, ∇Y Vi(t, Y ) = (φik)Nk=1 provided that φik is a solution to equation (3.26). Now,
along S we may express in equation (3.29) the co–state by the derivative of Vi with
respect to Y. Replacing Y = X∗(t) we obtain
− 1
2αi(t)
(∂xiVi(t,X
∗(t)))2 − hi(X∗(t)) = ∂tVi(t,X∗(t))+
N∑
k=1
∂xkVi(t,X
∗(t))
(
fk(X
∗(t))− 1
αk(t)
∂xkVk(t,X
∗(t))
)
.
By definition we have Vi(T,X) = 0 for all X. Therefore, instead of solving the PMP
equation we may ask to solve the N HJB for Vi = Vi(t,X) on [0, T ]×RN for i = 1, . . . , N
given by the reformulation of the previous equation:
∂tVi(t,X) +
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
∂xkVi(t,X)
(
fk(X)− 1
αk(t)
∂xkVk(t,X)
)
+ ∂xiVi(t,X)fi(X) =
(3.30)
−hi(X) + 1
2αi(t)
(∂xiVi(t,X))
2,
with terminal condition
Vi(T,X) = 0, i = 1, . . . , N.(3.31)
Remark 3.1. Since Vi(t, Y ) does not contain terminal costs of the type gi(X(T )) the
terminal condition for Vi is zero. In case of terminal costs we obtain Vi(T,X) = gi(X(T ))
and terminal constraints for the co-state φij as φ
i
j(T ) = ∂xjgi(X
∗(T )) in equation (3.26).
The aspect of the game theoretic concept is seen in the HJB equation (3.30) in the
mixed terms ∂xkVi. If we model particles i that do not anticipate the optimal choice of the
control of other particles j 6= i, then N minimization problems for Vi in equation (3.20)
are independent. Therefore the corresponding HJB for Vi and Vj with j 6= i decouple
and all mixed terms vanish. In a different setting this situation has been studied in [1, 2]
where only a single control for all particles is present.
Assume we have a (sufficiently regular) solution (Vi)
N
i=1 with Vi : [0, T ] × RN →
R. Then, we obtain the optimal control u∗i (t) and the optimal trajectory X∗(t) for
minimizing Vi by
(3.32) u∗i (t) = −
1
αi(t)
∂xiVi(t,X
∗(t)), i = 1, . . . , N,
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where X∗ fulfills equation (3.28). This is an implicit definition of u∗i . However, in view
of the dynamics (3.28) it is not necessary to solve equation (3.32) for u∗i . Similar to the
discussion in Section 2.1 we obtain a controlled systems dynamic provided we have a
solution to the HJB equation. The associated controlled dynamics are given by
(3.33)
d
dt
xi(t) = fi(X(t))− 1
αi(t)
∂xiVi(t,X(t)), j = 1, . . . , N,
and initial conditions (2.2). Comparing the HJB controlled dynamics with equation
(2.11) we observe that in the best–reply strategy the full solution to the HJB is not
required. Instead, ∂xiVi(t,X) is approximated by ∂xihi(X(t)). This approximation is
also obtained using a discretization of equation (3.30) in a MPC framework. Since the
equation for Vi is backwards in time we may use a semi discretization in time on the
interval (T −∆t, T ) given by
Vi(T,X)− Vi(T −∆t,X)
∆t
+
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
∂xkVi(T,X)
(
fk(X)− 1
αk(t)
∂xkVk(T,X)
)
+
+∂xiVi(T,X)fi(X) = −hi(X) +
1
2αi(t)
(∂xiVi(T,X))
2 +O(∆t),
Vi(T,X) = 0.
Using the terminal condition we obtain that Vi(T −∆t,X) = hi(X) for all X ∈ RN .
The derivation of the equation for the HJB equation for Vi(t, Y ) allows for an arbitrary
choice of T > t. Hence we may set the terminal time T also to T := t+ ∆t. This implies
to consider the value function
V ∆ti (t, Y ) =
∫ t+∆t
t
(
αi(s)
2
u2i (s) + hi(X(s))
)
ds
where X(s), s ∈ (t, t + ∆t) fulfills (3.28) and where we indicate the dependence on ∆t
by a superscript on Vi. Applying the explicit Euler discretization as shown before leads
therefore to
V ∆ti (t, Y ) = hi(Y ), Y = X(t).
Hence, the best–reply strategy applied at time t for a finite–dimensional problem of N
interacting particles coincides with an explicit Euler discretization of the HJB equation
for a value function given by V ∆ti (t, Y ) where Y = X(t) is the state of the particle system
at time t.
3.2. Meanfield limit of the HJB equation (3.30). Next, we turn to the meanfield
limit of equation (3.30) for i = 1, . . . , N. To this end we assume that (A) and (B) holds.
We further recall and introduce some notation;
X = (xi)
N
i=1, Z = (zi)
N
i=1, Z = (η, z1, . . . , zN−1), Zk := (zk, η, z1, . . . , zk−1, zk+1, . . . , zN−1) .
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We obtain the following set of equations for Vi(t,X) and i = 1, . . . , N,
∂tVi(t,X) +
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
∂xkVi(t,X)
(
f(xk, X−k)− 1
α(t)
∂xkVk(t,X)
)
(3.34)
+∂xiVi(t,X)f(xi, X−i) = −h(xi, X−i) +
1
2α(t)
(∂xiVi(t,X))
2 , Vi(t,X) = 0.
We show that a solution (Vi)
N
i=1 to the previous set of equations is obtained by considering
the equation (3.35) below. Suppose that a function W = W (t,Z) : [0, T ]×R×RN−1 → R
fulfills
∂tW (t,Z) +
N−1∑
k=1
∂zkW (t,Z)
(
f(Zk)− 1
α(t)
∂ηW (t,Z)
)
+ ∂ηW (t,Z)f(Z)(3.35)
= −h(Z) + 1
2α(t)
(∂ηW (t,Z))2 ,
and terminal condition W (T,Z) = 0. Suppose a solution W to equation (3.35) exists
and fulfills the previous equation pointwise a.e. (t,Z) ∈ [0, T ]× RN . Then, we define
(3.36) Vi(t,X) := W (t, xi, X−i), i = 1, . . . , N.
By definition W = W (t,Z), therefore the partial derivatives of Vi are computed as follows
where
(xi, X−i) = (η, z1, . . . , zN−1) :
∂tVi(t,X) = ∂tW (t, xi, X−i), ∂xiVi(t,X) = ∂ηW (t, xi, X−i),
∂xkVk(t,X) = ∂xkW (t, xk, X−k) = ∂ηW (t, xk, X−k),
∂xkVi(t,X) = ∂zkW (t,Z) for k ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1},
∂xkVi(t,X) = ∂zk−1W (t,Z) for k ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , N}.
Due to assumption (A) we have that
f(Zk) = f(zk, z1, . . . , zk−1, zk+1, . . . , zi−1, η, zi, . . . , zN−1)
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. The same is true for the argument of h. Therefore,
f(xk, X−k) = f(Zk)
and h(xi, X−i) = h(Z). Therefore, Vi(t,X) = W (t, xi, X−i) fulfills equation (3.34).
Hence, instead of studying equation (3.34) we may study the limit for N → ∞ of
equations (3.35). In view of Theorem A.1 a limit exists provided W is symmetric (and
fulfills uniform bound and uniform continuity estimates).
Note that, W as a solution to equation (3.35) is symmetric with respect to the argu-
ment (z1, . . . , zN−1). This holds true, since f and h are symmetric with respect to X−i for
any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Hence, in the following we may assume to have a solution W to equa-
tion (3.35) with the property that for any permutation σ : {1, . . . , N−1} → {1, . . . , N−1}
we have
(3.37) W (t,Z) = W (t, η, zσ1 , . . . , zσN−1).
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In view of Theorem A.1 we expect W (t,Z) to converge for for N → ∞ to a limit
function W : [0, T ]×R×P(R)→ R in the sense of Theorem A.1, i.e., up to a subsequence
and for Z ∈ RN
lim
N→∞
sup
|η|≤R,t∈[0,T ],Z−N⊂RN−1
|W (t,Z)−W(t, η,mN−1Z−N )| = 0
Similar to equation (2.7) we obtain that the limit W : [0, T ]× R× P(R)→ R fulfills
the convergence if the measure mN−1Z−N is replaced by the empirical measure m
N
Z for any
Z ∈ RN . Using the introduced notation in Section 2 we may therefore write
W (t,Z) = WN (t, η,mN−1Z−N ) ∼W(t, η,mNZ ).
Similarly, we obtain the following meanfield limits for N sufficiently large (and pro-
vided the assumptions of Theorem A.1 and [8, Theorem 4.1] are fulfilled.
∂tVi(t,X) = ∂tW (t, xi, X−i) = ∂tWN (t, xi,mN−1X−i ) ∼∂tW(t, xi,mNX),
hi(X) = h(xi, X−i) = hN (xi,mN−1X−i ) ∼h(xi,mNX),
(∂xiVi(t,X))
2 = (∂xiW (t, xi, X−i))
2 = (∂xiW
N (t, xi,m
N−1
X−i ))
2 ∼(∂xiW(t, xi,mNX))2.
It remains to discuss the limit of the mixed term in equations (3.34) and (3.35), respec-
tively.
(3.38)
N−1∑
k=1
∂zkW (t,Z)
(
f(Zk)− 1
α(t)
∂ηW (t,Z)
)
.
In order to derive the meanfield limit for equation (3.38) we require f to be symmetric
in all variables, i.e.,
(C) We assume f(Z) = f((zσi)
N
i=1) for any permutation σ : {1, . . . , N} → {1, . . . , N}
and for all Z ∈ RN .
Under assumption (C) we have in particular for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N} and a permutation
σ : {1, . . . , N − 1} → {1, . . . , N − 1}
f(Zk) = f(η, z1, . . . , zN−1) = f(η, zσ1 , . . . , zσN−1).
Therefore, f(Z) = fN (η,mN−1Z−N )). In the sense of equation (2.7) we further obtain
fN (η,m
N−1
Z−N )
) ∼ f(η,mNZ ) for any (η, Z). However under assumption (C) we also ob-
tain f(Z) = fN (m
N
Z ) ∼ f(mNZ ). Assuming the limit in Theorem A.1 is unique we obtain
that f is therefore independent of η.
Now, consider the discrete measure mNZ =
1
N
N∑
j=1
mNzj and mzj = δ(x − zj) ∈ P(R).
For each j we denote by mzj (ζ) = Z(ζ)#mzj the push forward of the discrete measure
with the flow field c : (t, t+a)×R×P(R)→ R and mzj (t) = mzj . Let the characteristic
equations for Z for fixed η be given by the flow field
(3.39)
d
dζ
Z(ζ) = c(ζ, η,mNZ (ζ)) := f(mNZ (ζ))−
1
α(ζ)
∂ηW(ζ, η,m
N
Z (ζ)).
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Similarly to equation (1.58), we obtain the directional derivative of the measure of
W(t, η,mNZ )with respect to the measure m
N
Z in direction of the vectorfield c at ζ = t as
N−1∑
k=1
∂zkW (t,Z)
(
f(Z)− 1
α(t)
∂ηW (t,Z)
)
∼
〈∂mW(t, η,mNZ ), f(mNZ )−
1
α(t)
∂ηW(t, η,m
N
Z )〉L2
mN
Z
,
where L2
mNZ
denotes the space of square integrable functions for the measure mNZ . Per-
forming the limits for N →∞ in the sense of equation (2.7), replacing η by x, we obtain
finally the meanfield equation for W = W(t, x,m) : [0, T ]× R× P(R)→ R given by
∂tW(t, x,m) + 〈∂mW(t, x,m), f(m)− 1
α(t)
∂xW(t, x,m)〉L2m + ∂xW(t, x,m)F(x,m)
(3.40)
= −h(x,m) + 1
2α(t)
(∂xW(t, x,m))
2 , W(T, x,m) = 0.
The previous equation is reformulated using the concept of directional derivatives of
measures m outlined in the Appendix A. Denote by c(t, x,m) = f(m)− 1α(t)∂xW(t, x,m)
a field. If mxj (t) ∈ P(R) for each t is obtained as push forward with the vector field
c, then, mxj fulfills in a weak sense the continuity equation (1.54). Therefore, m
N
X =
1
N
N∑
j=1
mxj fulfills
(3.41) ∂tm
N
X(t, x) + ∂x
(
c(t, x,mNX)m
N
X(t, x)
)
= 0.
As seen from the previous equations and the computations in equation (1.58) we therefore
have
∂tW(t, x,m
N
X(t, x)) + 〈∂mW(t, x,mNX(t, x)), f(mNX(t, x))−
1
α(t)
∂xW(t, x,m
N
X(t, x))〉L2
mN
X
=
d
dt
W(t, x,mNX(t, x)).
This motivates the following definition. For a family of measures (m(t))t∈[0,T ] with
m(t, ·) ∈ P(R), define w : [0, T ]× R→ R by
(3.42) w(t, x) := W(t, x,m(t, x)).
Then, from equation (3.40) we obtain
(3.43) ∂tw(t, x) + (∂xw(t, x)) f(m) = −h(x,m) + 1
2α(t)
(∂xw(t, x))
2
and from equation (3.41) we obtain using the definition (3.42)
(3.44) ∂tm(t, x) + ∂x
((
f(m)− 1
α(t)
∂xw(t, x)
)
m(t, x)
)
= 0.
Provided we may solve the meanfield equations (3.43) and (3.44) for (w,m) we obtain a
solution W along the characteristics in m−space by the implicit relation (3.42). In this
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sense and under the assumptions (A) to (C) the meanfield limit of equation (3.34) or
respectively equation (3.35) is given by the system of the following equations (3.45) and
(3.46) for w : [0, T ]× R→ R and m(t) ∈ P(R) for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The terminal condition
for w is given by w(T, x) = 0.
∂tw(t, x) + ∂x (w(t, x)) f(m(t, x))− 1
2α(t)
(∂xw(t, x))
2 = −h(x,m(t, x)),(3.45)
∂tm(t, x) + ∂x
((
f(m(t, x))− 1
α(t)
∂xw(t, x)
)
m(t, x)
)
= 0.(3.46)
We may also express the control u∗i given by equation (3.32), i.e.,
u∗i (t) = −
1
α(t)
∂xiVi(t, xi(t), X−i(t)),
in the meanfield limit. Under assumption (B) and using equation (3.36) and equation
(3.42) For any X we have
− 1
α(t)
∂xiVi(t,X) = −
1
α(t)
∂xW (t, xi, X−i) ∼ − 1
α(t)
∂xW(t, x,m
N
X) = −
1
α(t)
∂xw(t, x).
3.3. MPC and best reply strategy for the meanfield equation (3.45)–(3.46).
We obtain the best–reply strategy through a MPC approach. Note that the calculations
leading to equation (3.45) are independent of the terminal time T. Now, let a time
τ ∈ [0, T ] be fixed and let ∆t > 0 be sufficiently small. Consider the value function
on the receding horizon (τ, τ + ∆t) with initial conditions given at τ and where we, as
before, add ∆t as a superscript to indicate the dependence on the short time horizon:
(3.47) V ∆ti (τ, Y ) =
∫ τ+∆t
τ
(
αi(s)
2
u2i (s) + hi(X(s))ds
)
ds.
Repeating the derivation of the meanfield limit computations for V ∆ti we obtain equation
(3.45) defined only for t ∈ [τ, τ + ∆t]. Also, we obtain w(τ + ∆t, x) = 0. A first–order in
∆t approximation of the solution w(τ, x) to the (backwards in time ) equation (3.45) is
therefore given by
(3.48) w(τ, x) = h(x,m(t, x)) +O(∆t).
Substituting this relation in the equation for m in (3.45) we obtain the MPC meanfield
equation as
∂tm(t, x) + ∂x
((
f(m(t, x))− 1
α(t)
∂xh(x,m(t, x))
)
m(t, x)
)
= 0.(3.49)
This equation is precisely the same as we had obtained for the controlled dynamics using
the best–reply strategy derived in the previous section and given by equation (2.14).
Remark 3.2. The best–reply strategy for a meanfield game corresponds therefore to
considering at each time τ a value function measuring only the costs for a small next
time step. Those costs may depend on the optimal choices of the other agents. How-
ever, for a small time horizon the derivative of the running costs (i.e. h) is a sufficient
approximation to the otherwise intractable solution to the full system of meanfield equa-
tions (3.45)-(3.46).
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We summarize the findings in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Assume (A) to (C) holds true and let ∆t > 0 be given. Denote
by f(m) and h(x,m) the meanfield limit for N → ∞ of f(X) and h(X), respectively.
Assume that m : [0, T ]× R→ R be such that m(t, ·) ∈ P(R) and fulfill equation
∂tm(t, x) + ∂x
((
f(m(t, x))− 1
α(t)
∂xh(x,m(t, x))
)
m(t, x)
)
= 0.(3.50)
and let
w(t, x) = h(t, x).
Then, for any t ∈ [0, T ] and up to an error of order O(∆t) the function W : [t, t+ ∆t]×
R× P(R)→ R implicitly defined by
W(s, x,m(t, x)) = w(s, x), x ∈ R, s ∈ [t, t+ ∆t],
is a solution to the meanfield equation
∂sW(s, x,m) + 〈∂mW(s, x,m), f(m)− 1
α(s)
∂xW(s, x,m)〉L2m + ∂xW(s, x,m)f(m)
= −h(x,m) + 1
2α(s)
(∂xW(s, x,m))
2 , W(t+ ∆t, x,m) = 0.
The meanfield equation is the formal limit for N → ∞ of an N particle game on the
time interval (t, t+ ∆t) and described by equation (2.1) for i = 1, . . . , N, i.e.,
d
ds
xi(s) = fi(X(s)) + ui(s),
ui(s) = argmin u:[t,t+∆t]→R
∫ t+∆t
t
(
αi(s)
2
u2(r) + hi(X(r))
)
dr.
A solution to the associated ith HJB equations for Vi : [t, t + ∆t] × RN → R are given
by Vi(t,X) := W(s, xi,m
N
X−i) for i = 1, . . . , N, and the optimal control is u
∗
i (s) =
− 1αi(s)∂xiVi(s,X(s)).
Under assumption (C) the meanfield equation (3.50) coincides with the formal mean-
field equation obtained using the best reply strategy (2.14).
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Appendix A. Technical details
We collect some results of [12] for convenience. The Kantorowich–Rubenstein distance
d1(µ, ν) for measures µ, ν ∈ P(Q) is given defined by
(1.51) d1(µ, ν) := sup{
∫
φd(µ− ν) : φ : Q→ R, φ 1 - Lipschitz }.
Theorem A.1 (Theorem 2.1[12]). Let QN be a compact subset of RN . Consider a se-
quence of functions (uN )
∞
N=1 with uN : Q
N → R. Assume each uN (X) = uN (x1, . . . , xN )
is a symmetric function in all variables, i.e.,
uN (X) = uN (xσ(1), . . . , xσ(N))
for any permutation σ on {1, . . . , N}. Denote by d1 the Kantorowich–Rubenstein dis-
tance on the space of probability measures P(Q) and let ω be a modulus of continuity
independent of N . Assume that the sequence is uniformly bounded ‖uN‖L∞(QN ) ≤ C.
Further assume that for all X,Y ∈ QN and all N we have
|uN (X)− uN (Y )| ≤ ω(d1(mNX ,mNY ))
where mNξ ∈ P(Q) is defined by mNξ (x) = 1N
N∑
i=1
δ(x− ξi).
Then there exists a subsequence (uNk)k of (uN )N and a continuous map U : P(Q)→ R
such that
(1.52) lim
k→∞
sup
X∈RN
|uNk(X)− U(mNkX )| = 0.
An extension is found in [8, Theorem 4.1]. As toy example consider uN (X) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
φ(xi). If φ : R → R is compactly supported, bounded and |φ′(ξ)| ≤ C for all
ξ ∈ R, then the assumptions of the previous theorem are fulfilled. Note that the as-
sumption on φ implies that for each i we have |∂xiuN (X)| ≤ CN for all X and all N. This
condition implies the estimate on uN . The corresponding limit is given by the function
U : P(R)→ R defined by U(m) = ∫ φdm. We have U(mNX) = uN (X).
Derivatives in the space of measures are described for example in [3]. They may be
motivated by the following formal computation. Let ψ be a smooth function on R and
let y′(t) = c for t ∈ (a, b) and y(a) = x. We denote by a subindex t = a the evaluation
at t = a of the corresponding expression and by a prime the derivative of ψ. Then,
cψ′(x) =
∫
ψ′(z)cδ(x− z)dz =
(∫
ψ′(z)cδ(y(t)− z)dz
)
|t=a =(∫
ψ∂z (cδ(y(t)− z))
)
|t=a,
cψ′(x) =
(
d
dt
ψ(y(t))
)
|t=a =
(
d
dt
∫
ψ(z)δ(y(t)− z)dz
)
|t=a
Therefore, we may write
∂tδ(y(t)− z) + ∂z (c δ(y(t)− z)) = 0
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provided that y′(t) = c. Further, δ(y(t) − z) = y(t)#δ(x − z) where # is the push
forward operator, see below. Hence, for the family of measures δ(y(t)− z) the previous
computation lead to a notion of derivatives. This can be formalized to a calculus for
derivatives in measure space and we summarize in the following more general results
from [3, Chapter II.8]. We consider the space of probability measures Pp(R) [3, Equation
(5.1.22)]:
Pp(R) =
{
µ ∈ P(R) :
∫
|x− x¯|pdµ(x) <∞ for some x¯ ∈ R
}
.
We assume Pp(R) is equipped with the Wasserstein distance Wp(µ, ν) [3, Chapter 7.1.1].
In the case p = 1 and for bounded measures µ, ν this distance is equivalent to d1(ν, µ)
defined in equation (1.51). For the case p = 2 we refer to [5] for a different characteri-
zation.
We consider absolutely continuous curves m : (a, b) → Pp(R). The curve m is called
absolutely continuous if there exists a function M ∈ L1(a, b) such that for all a ≤ s <
t ≤ b we have
(1.53) Wp(m(s),m(t)) ≤
∫ t
s
M(ξ)dξ,
see [3, Definition 1.1.1]. For an absolutely continuous curve m : (a, b) → Pp(R), i.e.,
m(t) ∈ Pp(R), and p > 1 there exists a vector field v : (a, b) × R → R with v(t) ∈
Lp(R;m(t)) a.e. t ∈ (a, b) such that the continuity equation
(1.54) ∂tm(t, x) + ∂x (v(t, x)m(t, x)) = 0
holds in a distributional sense. Further, ‖v(t)‖Lp(R;m(t)) ≤ |m′|(t) a.e. in t. Here, t →
|m′|(t) for t ∈ (a, b) is the metric derivative of the curve m. The precise statement is
given in [3, Theorem 8.3.1] and the metric derivative is given in [3, Theorem 1.1.2] by
(1.55) |m′|(t) := lim
s→t
Wp(m(s),m(t))
|s− t| .
The limit exists a.e. in t, provided that m is absolutely continuous (1.53). We have
|m′|(t) ≤ M(t) a.e. for each function M fulfilling equation (1.53), see [3, Chapter 1].
Also, the converse result holds true: If m fulfills in a weak sense equation (1.54) for
some v ∈ L1(a, b;Lp(R;m(·)), then m is absolutely continuous. Furthermore, solutions
to equation (1.54) can be represented using the methods of characteristics, see [3, Lemma
8.1.6, Proposition 8.1.8]. Under suitable assumptions on m and v we have that a weak
solution to equation (1.54) is
(1.56) m(t, ·) = X(t; a, ·)#m(a, ·) ∀t ∈ [a, b]
provided that X(t) solves characteristic system for every x ∈ R and every s ∈ [a, b] :
(1.57) X(s; s, x) = x and ∂tX(t; s, x) = v(t,X(t; s, x)).
Here, (s, x) is the initial position of the characteristic in phase space and # is the
push forward operator, i.e., if applied to the set {x} we have m(t, {X(t; a, x)}) =
m(a, {X(a; a, x)}) = m(a, {x}). Equation (1.54) may also be viewed as the directional
derivative of the family of measures m(t, ·) in direction v.
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In Section 3 we need to discuss a term of the type
N∑
j=1
c(xj)∂xjf(x1, . . . , xN ) for a
symmetric function f. Now, consider a family of paths mj : (a, b)→ P(R) generated by
mj(t, z) = yj(t)#δ(xj − z) where yj solves the characteristic equation y′j(t) = c(yj(t))
and yj(a) = xj . Let m
N
Y (t, z) :=
1
N
N∑
j=1
δ(yj(t)− z). We have then
∂tm
N
Y (t, x) = −∂x
(
c(x)mNY (t, x)
)
.
If we assume that f fulfills the assumption of Theorem A.1, then, there exists : P(R)→ R
and then f(y1(t), . . . , yN (t)) = fN (m
N
Y ) ∼ f(mNY ) in the sense of equation (2.7). The
following computation similar to the motivation shows the expression of the unknown
term for large N :
N∑
j=1
c(xj)∂xjf(x1, . . . , xN ) =
d
dt
f(y1(t), . . . , yj(t), . . . , yN (t))|t=a(1.58)
=
d
dt
fN (m
N
Y (t))|t=a ∼
d
dt
f(mNY (t))|t=a(1.59)
In order to make the link with the theory developed in [12], we note that the last
derivative at m = mNY can be interpreted as
d
dt
f(mNY (t))|t=a = 〈∂mf(m), c〉L2m ,
with L2m the space of square integrable functions with respect to the measure m. This
formula can either be seen as the definition of ∂mf(m) if one follows the approach of [3]
(which is the route taken here) or as a consequence of its definition if one follows the
approach of [12].
Acknowledgments. This work has been supported by KI-Net NSF RNMS grant No.
1107444, grants DFG Cluster of Excellence ’Production technologies for high–wage coun-
tries’, BMBF KinOpt and CNRS PEPS-HuMaI grant ’DEESSes’. MH and JGL are
grateful for the opportunity to stay and work at Imperial College, London, UK, in the
Department of Mathematics. PD is on leave from CNRS Institut de Mathe´matiques de
Toulouse UMR 5219; F-31062 Toulouse, France.
References
[1] G. Albi, M. Herty, and L. Pareschi, Kinetic description of optimal control problems and appli-
cations to opinion consensus, Comm. Math. Sci., (2014).
[2] G. Albi, L. Pareschi, and M. Zanella, Boltzmann type control of opinion consensus through
leaders, arXiv preprint arXiv:1405.0736, (2014).
[3] L. Ambrosio, N. Gigli, and G. Savare, Gradient Flows in Metric Spaces of Probability Measures,
Lectures in Mathematics, Birkha¨user Verlag, Basel, Boston, Berlin, 2008.
[4] R. J. Aumann, Existence of competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders, Econo-
metrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, (1966), pp. 1–17.
[5] J.-D. Benamou and Y. Brenier, A computational fluid mechanics solution to the monge-
kantorovich mass transfer problem, Numer. Math., 84 (2000), pp. 375–393.
22 PIERRE DEGOND, MICHAEL HERTY, AND JIAN-GUO LIU
[6] A. Bensoussan, J. Frehse, and P. Yam, Mean Field Games and Mean Field Type Control Theory,
Series: SpringerBriefs in Mathematics, New York, 2013.
[7] A. Bensoussan, J. Frehse, and P. Yam, The master equation in mean field theory, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1404.4150, (2014).
[8] A. Blanchet and G. Carlier, From nash to cournot-nash equilibria via the monge-kantorovich
problem, arXiv preprint arXiv:1404.5485, (2014).
[9] J.-P. Bouchaud and M. Me´zard, Wealth condensation in a simple model of economy, Phys. A,
282 (2000), pp. 536–545.
[10] A. Bressan, Noncooperative differential games, Milan Journal of Mathematics, 79 (2011), pp. 357–
427.
[11] M. Caponigro, M. Fornasier, B. Piccoli, and E. Tre´lat, Sparse stabilization and optimal
control of the Cucker-Smale model., Math. Control Relat. Fields, 3 (2013), pp. 447–466.
[12] P. Cardaliaguet, Notes on mean field games, from P.-L. Lions lectures at College de France,
(2010).
[13] R. Carmona, J.-P. Fouque, and L.-H. Sun, Mean field games and systemic risk, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1308.2172 (to appear in Comm. Math. Sci.), (2013).
[14] S. Cordier, L. Pareschi, and G. Toscani, On a kinetic model for a simple market economy, J.
Stat. Phys., 120 (2005), pp. 253–277.
[15] I. Couzin, J. Krause, N. Franks, and S. Levin, Effective leadership and decision-making in
animal groups on the move, Nature, 433 (2005), pp. 513–516.
[16] P. Degond, C. Appert-Rolland, M. Moussaid, J. Pettre´, and G. Theraulaz, A hierarchy
of heuristic-based models of crowd dynamics, J. Stat. Phys., 152 (2013), pp. 1033–1068.
[17] P. Degond, J.-G. Liu, and C. Ringhofer, Evolution of the distribution of wealth in an economic
environment driven by local nash equilibria, Journal of Statistical Physics, 154 (2014), pp. 751–780.
[18] , Evolution of wealth in a nonconservative economy driven by local nash equilibria, Phl. Trans.
Roy. Soc. A, 372 (2014).
[19] , Large-scale dynamics of mean-field games driven by local nash equilibria, Journal of Nonlinear
Science, 24 (2014), pp. 93–115.
[20] M. Fornasier and F. Solombrino, Mean-field optimal control, submitted to ESAIM: Control,
Optimization, and Calculus of Variations, (preprint arXiv:1306.5913), (2013).
[21] J.-P. Fouque and J. A. Langsam, Handbook on Systemic Risk, Cambridge University Press, 2013.
[22] A. Friedman, Differential games, American Mathematical Society, Providence, R.I., 1974. Exposi-
tory lectures from the CBMS Regional Conference held at the University of Rhode Island, Kingston,
R.I., June 4–8, 1973, Conference Board of the Mathematical Sciences Regional Conference Series in
Mathematics, No. 18.
[23] L. Gru¨ne and J. Pannek, Nonlinear model predictive control, Communications and Control En-
gineering Series, Springer, London, 2011. Theory and algorithms.
[24] O. Gue´ant, J.-M. Lasry, and P.-L. Lions, Mean field games and applications, in Paris-Princeton
Lectures on Mathematical Finance 2010, Springer, 2011, pp. 205–266.
[25] M. Herty, S. Steffensen, and L. Pareschi, Mean-field control and Riccati equations, preprint,
(2014).
[26] J.-M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions, Mean field games, Japanese Journal of Mathematics, 2 (2007),
pp. 229–260.
[27] A. Mas-Colell, On a theorem of schmeidler, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 13 (1984),
pp. 201–206.
[28] D. Q. Mayne and H. Michalska, Receding horizon control of nonlinear systems, IEEE Trans.
Automat. Control, 35 (1990), pp. 814–824.
[29] S. Motsch and E. Tadmor, Heterophilious dynamics enhances consensus, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1301.4123, (2013).
[30] G. Naldi, L. Pareschi, and G. Toscani, Mathematical Modeling of Collective Behavior in Socio-
Economic and Life Sciences, Series: Modeling and Simulation in Science, Engineering and Technol-
ogy, Birkhauser, Boston, 2010.
MEANFIELD GAMES AND MODEL PREDICTIVE CONTROL 23
[31] D. Schmeidler, Equilibrium points of nonatomic games, Journal of Statistical Physics, 7 (1973),
pp. 295–300.
[32] N. Z. Shapiro and L. S. Shapley, Values of large games, i: a limit theorem, Mathematics of
Operations Research, 3 (1978), pp. 1–9.
[33] E. D. Sontag, Mathematical control theory, vol. 6 of Texts in Applied Mathematics, Springer-
Verlag, New York, second ed., 1998. Deterministic finite-dimensional systems.
[34] T. Vicsek and A. Zafeiris, Collective motion, Physics Reports, 517 (2012), pp. 71–140.
(P. Degond) Department of Mathematics, Imperial College London, London SW7 2AZ,
United Kingdom
E-mail address: pdegond@imperial.ac.uk
(M. Herty) RWTH Aachen University, Department of Mathematics, RWTH Aachen Uni-
versity, D-52062 Aachen, Germany (herty@igpm.rwth-aachen.de)
E-mail address: herty@igpm.rwth-aachen.de
(J.-G. Liu) Department of Physics and Department of Mathematics, Duke University,
Durham, NC 27708, USA (jliu@phy.duke.edu)
E-mail address: jliu@phy.duke.edu
